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Abstract
Social punishment, whereby cooperators punish defec-
tors, has been suggested as an important mechanism
that promotes the emergence of cooperation or main-
tenance of social norms in the context of the one-shot
(i.e. non-repeated) interaction. However, whenever an-
tisocial punishment, whereby defectors punish cooper-
ators, is available, this antisocial behavior outperforms
social punishment, leading to the destruction of coop-
eration. In this paper, we use evolutionary game the-
ory to show that this antisocial behavior can be ef-
ficiently restrained by relying on prior commitments,
wherein agents can arrange, prior to an interaction,
agreements regarding posterior compensation by those
who dishonor the agreements. We show that, although
the commitment mechanism by itself can guarantee a
notable level of cooperation, a significantly higher level
is achieved when both mechanisms, those of propos-
ing prior commitments and of punishment, are available
in co-presence. Interestingly, social punishment prevails
and dominates in this system as it can take advantage of
the commitment mechanism to cope with antisocial be-
haviors. That is, establishment of a commitment system
helps to pave the way for the evolution of social punish-
ment and abundant cooperation, even in the presence of
antisocial punishment.
Introduction
Punishment has been suggested as one of the most impor-
tant instruments or mechanisms for enforcing cooperation
and compliance of social norms in various societies (Fehr
and Gachter 2002; Herrmann, Tho¨ni, and Ga¨chter 2008;
Powers, Taylor, and Bryson 2012; Airiau, Sen, and Villatoro
2014; Sigmund, Hauert, and Nowak 2001; Boyd et al. 2003;
Sigmund et al. 2010). Numerous empirical studies show
that human subjects are eager to incur a cost to pun-
ish unjust behaviors and violation of social norms (Fehr
and Gachter 2002; Herrmann, Tho¨ni, and Ga¨chter 2008;
De Quervain et al. 2004). While sanctioning systems have
been widely implemented in modern societies for law en-
forcement, many social norms are still enforced through pri-
vate sanctions (Fehr and Gachter 2002). Punishment has also
been implemented in several computerized systems such as
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virtual online agent societies (Savarimuthu et al. 2009) and
e-marketplace (Michalak et al. 2009), in order to enhance
cooperative behavior and norms compliance, e.g. by both
customers and sellers (Michalak et al. 2009).
Given the abundance of the social punishment behavior
(i.e. punishment targeting at wrongdoers or defectors), the
puzzle is, how this behavior could evolve as it is costly to
punish others, hence unlikely to evolve unless it results in di-
rect or indirect benefits. Various studies have argued that this
kind of punishment can evolve if it is cost-effective, i.e. the
punished agent suffers a sufficiently higher cost compared
to that of the punisher (Sigmund, Hauert, and Nowak 2001;
Boyd et al. 2003; Sigmund et al. 2010). However, it ap-
pears that this argument is only valid if antisocial punish-
ment (i.e. defectors punish cooperators) is not allowed or
unavailable, as shown in recent work (Rand et al. 2010;
Rand and Nowak 2011). In fact, as defined, an antisocial
punisher can take advantage of the cost-efficiency effect of
punishment even after its wrongdoing, by punishing any co-
operative co-player. As such, antisocial punishment reduces
even further the chance that cooperation can survive. More-
over, empirical studies show that antisocial punishment does
exist across cultures, see e.g. (Herrmann, Tho¨ni, and Ga¨chter
2008). Thus, a more subtle question arises: whether and how
social punishment could evolve in different societies under
the presence of antisocial behaviors?
A major approach to addressing this query has been based
on reputation (for a review, see (Raihani and Bshary 2015)).
The key idea is, if agents’ actions are assumed or made pub-
licly available, social punishers can gain indirect benefits
through maintaining a good reputation of punishing wrong-
doers and unjust behavior (Hilbe and Traulsen 2012) (more
discussion on this in Related Work).
In this paper, we propose and analyze a novel approach to
resolving this antisocial behavior issue, without relying on
reputation and the assumption that agents’ actions are non-
anonymous, which is not realistic in many contexts or ap-
plication domains (Nowak 2006), e.g. in populations or sys-
tems with a large number of agents, or when activities obser-
vation is not easy. We use methods from evolutionary game
theory (Hofbauer and Sigmund 1998; Sigmund 2010) (see
Models and Methods section) to show that antisocial pun-
ishment can be significantly restrained by relying on prior
commitments (Nesse 2001; Han et al. 2013; Han, Pereira,
and Lenaerts 2015), wherein agents can arrange, prior to
an interaction, agreements regarding posterior compensation
by those who dishonor the agreements. This commitment
proposing mechanism has been studied widely in Artificial
Intelligence (AI) and Multi-agent System (MAS) literature
(see e.g. (Castelfranchi and Falcone 2010; Winikoff 2007;
Hasan and Raja 2013)), and has been shown to promote the
evolution of cooperation (Han, Pereira, and Santos 2012;
Han 2013; Han et al. 2013; Martinez-Vaquero et al. 2015;
Han et al. 2015). By proposing a commitment deal regard-
ing posterior punishment (prior to an interaction) one can
prevent antisocial behavior as only those who agree with
the deal (and its terms) then default on it can be punished
(detailed description in Models and Methods). Most inter-
estingly, as we shall show in Results section, the presence
of the commitment mechanism helps to pave the way for
the prevalence of social punishment and cooperation, rather
than the commitment proposing agents themselves.
As the underlying agent interaction framework, we adopt
here the one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) (Sigmund 2010),
one of the most popular frameworks to study the evolution of
cooperation amongst self-regarding agents. This game also
stands for the most difficult pairwise social dilemma for co-
operation to emerge (Hofbauer and Sigmund 1998). In this
game, two players simultaneously decide to either cooper-
ate (C) or defect (D). If both play C, they get more than if
both play D, but if one defects and the other cooperates, the
defector gets the highest payoff and the cooperator gets the
lowest (further details on the PD in Models and Methods
section). That is, rational choice determines that it is better
for each player to defect, even though both would be better
off cooperating. Consequently, evolutionary game dynamics
predicts that under those conditions cooperation disappears
(Nowak 2006; Sigmund 2010).
Related Work
Punishment has been a major explanation for the evolu-
tion of cooperation in the context of the one-shot inter-
action (Fehr and Gachter 2002; De Quervain et al. 2004;
Sigmund et al. 2010; Powers, Taylor, and Bryson 2012) (for
other explanations, see a survey in (Nowak 2006)). Sev-
eral theoretical models (Sigmund, Hauert, and Nowak 2001;
Boyd et al. 2003; Hauert et al. 2007) have been analyzed,
showing that social punishment can promote the emergence
of social punishment and cooperation. However, these early
works do not integrate the possibility of antisocial punish-
ment in their models, assuming that only cooperators can
punish defectors. Only when experimental evidence, from
numerous countries, e.g. in (Herrmann, Tho¨ni, and Ga¨chter
2008), pointed out that antisocial punishment does exist, this
aspect has been paid more attention. In the models of (Rand
et al. 2010; Rand and Nowak 2011) wherein antisocial pun-
ishment is integrated, the authors show that the evolution of
social punishment, hence also that of cooperation, is prohib-
ited. Yet these works do not show how to overcome the an-
tisocial punishment issue, i.e. how social punishment could
evolve in the presence of antisocial punishers. Going beyond
these previous works, this paper presents a solution to this
issue, showing that when accompanied by the possibility to
arrange prior commitments, social punishment and coopera-
tion can thrive even in the presence of antisocial punishment.
Furthermore, it is noteworthy that commitment, by itself,
provides a pathway for the evolution of cooperation in the
one-shot PD (Han, Pereira, and Santos 2012; Nesse 2001;
Hasan and Raja 2013; Han et al. 2013; 2015; Sasaki et al.
2015). This mechanism, however, has never been studied
in co-presence with antisocial punishment, even when com-
mitment and social punishment have been analyzed together
(Han and Lenaerts 2015). Additionally, this latter work aims
to analyze how to integrate the two mechanisms into a sin-
gle one in order to better deal with commitment free-riders
and defectors; while the aim of the current work is to find
a new solution for the antisocial punishment issue, thereby
providing an explanation for the conundrum of the evolution
of social punishment. Nevertheless, it would be interesting
to study whether the integrated strategy described in (Han
and Lenaerts 2015) can help deal even better with the an-
tisocial punishment issue. We intend to study this in future
work.
A major approach to addressing the antisocial punishment
issue is to rely on reputation (Raihani and Bshary 2015),
wherein agents’ actions are assumed to be non-anonymous
to others in a population. As such, social punishers can
gain indirect benefits through maintaining a good reputa-
tion of punishing wrongdoers and unjust behavior. It is be-
cause being identified as a social punisher reduces the risk
of being cheated badly (Hilbe and Traulsen 2012). Differ-
ently from this reputation-based approach, our commitment
based solution does not generally require the assumption
of non-anonymity, which is not reasonable in many con-
texts; for instance, it is difficult to track others’ activities
in a large MAS or society of agents. In fact, commitments
can be enforced through several different means, such as
legal contracts, pledges, emotion and also the reputation
device itself (Nesse 2001; Han, Pereira, and Santos 2012;
Han, Pereira, and Lenaerts 2015; Han et al. 2015). As such,
it appears that our approach is applicable to more diverse
situations, and is more easily facilitated and deployed, than
the reputation-based one—especially given that contractual
commitments are generally enforceable in modern societies.
Finally, it is important to note that both punishment and
commitment have been studied extensively in AI and MAS
literature (Airiau, Sen, and Villatoro 2014; Wooldridge and
Jennings 1999; Castelfranchi and Falcone 2010; Winikoff
2007; Harrenstein, Brandt, and Fischer 2007; Savarimuthu
et al. 2009; Chopra and Singh 2009; Savarimuthu and Crane-
field 2011). Differently from our work, these studies aim at
using the cooperation enforcing power of the two mecha-
nisms for the purpose of regulating individual and collec-
tive behaviors, formalizing different relevant aspects of these
mechanisms (such as norms and conventions) in a MAS.
Moreover, to our knowledge, no work exists in this liter-
ature that studies the two mechanisms in co-presence (for
such regulating purposes). As we shall show later, the co-
presence of the two mechanisms in a system leads to a
significantly higher level of cooperation than what can be
achieved with either mechanism solely. Therefore, our re-
sults and approach provide insights into the design of com-
puterized and MAS systems that can, on the one hand, pre-
vent antisocial behaviors, and on the other hand, maximize
the benefit of an appropriate sanctioning system; for in-
stance, together with sanctioning, one should also facilitate
arrangement and enforcement of prior commitments.
Models and Methods
We first recall the Prisoner’s Dilemma game and its exten-
sions integrating the option of using costly punishment or
arranging prior commitments. We then describe the main
model where both strategic options are included.
Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD)
To begin with, the (one-shot) PD can be described with the
following payoff matrix:
„ C D
C R,R S, T
D T, S P, P
«
(1)
Once the interaction is established and both players have
decided to play C or D, both players receive the same re-
ward R (penalty P ) for mutual cooperation (mutual defec-
tion). Unilateral cooperation provides the sucker’s payoff S
for the cooperative player and the temptation to defect T
for the defecting one. The payoff matrix corresponds to the
preferences associated with the PD when the parameters sat-
isfy the ordering, T > R > P > S (Sigmund 2010). For
the sake of a simple representation, we sometimes use the
Donor game (Sigmund 2010), a special case of the PD, with
T = b, R = b − c, P = 0, S = −c, where b and c stand
for the benefit and cost of cooperation, respectively.
PD with Punishment
We extend the PD with the option of costly punishment. Af-
ter the PD has taken place, a player can choose to punish
her opponent, which consists in paying a cost 1 to make
the opponent incur a cost δ1. As usual (Rand et al. 2010;
Boyd et al. 2003), we assume that 1 < δ1.
We now define the social and antisocial punishment
strategies, denoted by CP and AP, respectively. CP coop-
erates in the PD, and punishes a co-player who defected in
the game. In contrast to CP, AP defects in the PD, and pun-
ishes a co-player who cooperated in the game. These two
strategies, together with the two traditional unconditional
strategies, pure cooperator (C) and pure defector (D) (i.e.
they do not use the punishment option), forms a minimal
model that allows us to analyze evolutionary dynamics and
viability of punishment strategies and the induced coopera-
tion level (Rand et al. 2010). The 4 × 4 payoff matrix (for
row player) is given by
0B@
CP C D AP
CP R R S − 1 S − δ1 − 1
C R R S S − δ1
D T − δ1 T P P
AP T − δ1 − 1 T − 1 P P
1CA (2)
PD with Commitment
We now recall the commitment variant of the PD game, as
described in (Han et al. 2013). Before playing the PD, a
commitment strategy (denoted by COM), proposes to her
co-player to commit to the game and cooperate. To make the
commitment deal reliable, the proposer pays an arrangement
cost 2. If the co-player agrees with the deal, then COM
assumes that the opponent will cooperate, yet there is no
guarantee that this will actually be the case. When the op-
ponent accepts the commitment though later does not coop-
erate, she has to compensate the non-defaulting co-player at
a personal cost δ2. The PD interaction does not occur if the
co-player does not accept the commitment deal. As in (Han
et al. 2013), we consider a minimal model with five (basic)
strategies in this commitment variant of the PD game:
(i) Commitment proposers (COM), who proposes com-
mitment before the PD, cooperates if the game occurs;
(ii) Unconditional cooperators (C), who always commit
when being proposed a commitment deal, cooperate
whenever the PD is played, but do not propose com-
mitment themselves;
(iii) Unconditional defectors (D), who do not accept com-
mitment, defect when the PD takes place, and do not
propose commitment;
(iv) Fake committers (FAKE), who accept a commitment
proposal yet do not cooperate whenever the PD takes
place. These players assume that they can exploit the
commitment proposing players without suffering the
consequences;
(v) Commitment free-riders (FREE), who defect unless
being proposed a commitment, which they then ac-
cept and cooperate subsequently in the PD. In other
words, these players are willing to cooperate when a
commitment is proposed but are not prepared to pay
the cost of setting it up.
The rationale for considering this restricted set of strategies
is that the other possible strategies are dominated by at least
one of these five strategies in any configuration of the game:
they can be omitted without changing the outcome of the
analysis (Han et al. 2013).
The 5× 5 payoff matrix (for row player) is given by
0BBB@
COM C D FAKE FREE
COM R− 2
2
R− 2 0 S + δ2 − 2 R− 2
C R R S S S
D 0 T P P P
FAKE T − δ2 T P P P
FREE R T P P P
1CCCA (3)
PD with Punishment and Commitment
We now extend the commitment variant to integrate the
costly punishment strategic behavior. First, when a commit-
ment deal is set up, the terms of the commitment regarding
posterior compensation is called upon, if necessary, after the
PD occurs. That is, punishment is not utilized in this case 1.
Next, if no commitment deal is set up before the PD
interaction—for instance when neither of the players in the
1Punishment could occur, e.g. after the terms of commitment
have been carried out as conflict might occur in this process. This
is indeed an interesting issue but it is beyond the scope of this work.
PD is a commitment proposer (COM), or when a commit-
ment proposal is rejected—costly punishment can be used
after the PD has occurred. By definition of the punishment
strategies, a C player will adopt social punishment (i.e. CP),
while D, FREE and FAKE will adopt antisocial punishment
(i.e. AP). Abusing notation, they are denoted by CP, AP,
FREE-AP and FAKE-AP, respectively.
For a clear and fair comparison of the punishment and
commitment strategies as well as the induced cooperation
levels in different models, we consider, next to the five
strategies obtained via the extension (i.e. COM, CP, AP,
FREE-AP and FAKE-AP), also the unconditional cooper-
ator (C) and unconditional defector (D) strategies (which
do not use commitment and punishment). That is, for the
current PD variant with both strategic options, we will ana-
lyze a minimal model of seven strategies: COM, C, D, CP,
AP, FREE-AP, and FAKE-AP. Their payoff matrix can be
directly derived from matrices (2) and (3), substituting for
each pair of strategies the corresponding payoff outcomes.
Note that some strategies can be (and are) omitted in this
model, including FREE and FAKE that do not use antisocial
punishment, because they are dominated by FREE-AP and
FAKE-AP, respectively (since 1 < δ1).
Population Setup and Evolutionary Dynamics
All the analysis and numerical results in this paper (see
next section) are obtained using evolutionary game theory
(EGT) methods for finite populations (Nowak et al. 2004;
Imhof, Fudenberg, and Nowak 2005). In such a setting,
agents’ payoff represents their fitness or social success, and
evolutionary dynamics is shaped by social learning (Hof-
bauer and Sigmund 1998; Sigmund 2010), whereby the most
successful agents will tend to be imitated more often by the
other agents. In the current work, social learning is mod-
eled using the so-called pairwise comparison rule (Traulsen,
Nowak, and Pacheco 2006), a standard approach in EGT, as-
suming that an agentAwith fitness fA adopts the strategy of
another agent B with fitness fB with probability p given by
the Fermi function, pA,B =
(
1 + e−β(fB−fA)
)−1
. The pa-
rameter β represents the ‘imitation strength’ or ‘intensity of
selection’, i.e., how strongly the agents base their decision to
imitate on fitness difference between themselves and the op-
ponents. For β = 0, we obtain the limit of neutral drift – the
imitation decision is random. For large β, imitation becomes
increasingly deterministic.
In the absence of mutations or exploration, the end states
of evolution are inevitably monomorphic: once such a state
is reached, it cannot be escaped through imitation. We thus
further assume that, with a certain mutation probability,
an agent switches randomly to a different strategy with-
out imitating another agent. In the limit of small mutation
rates, the dynamics will proceed with, at most, two strate-
gies in the population, such that the behavioral dynamics
can be conveniently described by a Markov Chain, where
each state represents a monomorphic population, whereas
the transition probabilities are given by the fixation probabil-
ity of a single mutant (Imhof, Fudenberg, and Nowak 2005;
Nowak et al. 2004). The resulting Markov Chain has a sta-
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Figure 1: Transitions and stationary distributions; a) An-
tisocial punishment and defection dominate when propos-
ing commitment is not an option; b) Commitment dom-
inates when no punishment option is available; c) When
both punishment and commitment are present, CP domi-
nates and a higher level of cooperation is achieved. COM
catalyzes for the dominance of CP and cooperation. For clar-
ity, only transitions that are stronger than neural are shown
(arrow). Dashed lines stand for neutral transitions. Blue and
red circles represent cooperative and defective strategies, re-
spectively. Parameters: T = 4, R = 3, P = 0, S = 1;
1 = 2 = 1, δ1 = δ2 = 3; β = 0.1; population size
N = 100.
tionary distribution, which characterizes the average time
the population spends in each of these monomorphic end
states (for illustration, see already examples in Figure 1).
LetN be the size of the population. Denote piX,Y the pay-
off a strategist X obtains in a pairwise interaction with strate-
gist Y (defined in the payoff matrices). Suppose there are at
most two strategies in the population, say, k agents using
strategy A (0 ≤ k ≤ N ) and (N −k) agents using strategies
B. Thus, the (average) payoff of the agent that uses A and B
can be written as follows, respectively,
ΠA(k) =
(k − 1)piA,A + (N − k)piA,B
N − 1 ,
ΠB(k) =
kpiB,A + (N − k − 1)piB,B
N − 1 .
(4)
Now, the probability to change the number k of agents
using strategy A by ± one in each time step can be written
as(Traulsen, Nowak, and Pacheco 2006)
T±(k) =
N − k
N
k
N
[
1 + e∓β[ΠA(k)−ΠB(k)]
]−1
. (5)
The fixation probability of a single mutant with a strategy
A in a population of (N − 1) agents using B is given by
(Traulsen, Nowak, and Pacheco 2006; Nowak et al. 2004)
ρB,A =
1 + N−1∑
i=1
i∏
j=1
T−(j)
T+(j)
−1 . (6)
Considering a set {1, ..., q} of different strategies, these
fixation probabilities determine a transition matrix M =
{Tij}qi,j=1, with Tij,j 6=i = ρji/(q − 1) and Tii = 1 −∑q
j=1,j 6=i Tij , of a Markov Chain. The normalized eigen-
vector associated with the eigenvalue 1 of the transposed
of M provides the stationary distribution described above
(Imhof, Fudenberg, and Nowak 2005), describing the rela-
tive time the population spends adopting each of the strate-
gies.
Risk-dominance An important measure to compare the
two strategies A and B is which direction the transition is
stronger or more probable, an A mutant fixating in a popu-
lation of agents using B, ρB,A, or a B mutant fixating in the
population of agents using A, ρA,B . It can be shown that the
former is stronger, in the limit of large N , if (Nowak et al.
2004; Sigmund 2010)
piA,A + piA,B > piB,A + piB,B . (7)
Results
We study the performance of punishment and commitment
strategies and the induced cooperation levels in three afore-
mentioned scenarios: no commitment (CP, C, D, AP), no
punishment (COM, C, D, FREE, FAKE) and when both are
available (COM, C, D, CP, AP, FREE-AP, FAKE-AP).
Stationary Distributions
To begin with, we compute stationary distributions and tran-
sition probabilities in each of the three scenarios. First, in
the system where proposing commitment is not an option
(Figure 1a), antisocial punishment (AP) and unconditional
defector (D) dominate the population. Although there is no
above-neutral transition from CP to those strategies, its neu-
tral transitions to C, which is in turn dominated by D and AP,
leads to the dominance of these defective strategies. Note
that, using the inequality (7) and the property of the PD
(T > R > P > S) we can show that AP is risk-dominant
against both C and CP 2, and C is dominated by D, showing
that the transitions in Figure 1a hold not only for the specific
game configuration being considered.
Next, in the system where punishment is not an option
(Figure 1b), defective strategies (i.e. D, FREE and FAKE)
are dominated by COM, which is taken away by C, then
back to defective strategies, creating a cycle among cooper-
ative and defective strategies . This cycle has been shown to
hold in general for sufficiently strong commitment deals (i.e.
when δ2 is roughly larger than the cost of arranging com-
mitment 2 plus the cost of cooperation c) (Han et al. 2013).
This cycle results in a high fraction of COM but defectors are
not vanished (the total fraction of the three defective strate-
gies in Figure 1b is 37%).
We now consider the system where both strategic behav-
iors are available (Figure 1c). Interestingly, the cycle ob-
served in Figure 1b (i.e. from defective strategies D, AP,
2They are equivalent to, T + P > R + S − δ1 and T + P >
R+ S, respectively. Both clearly hold.
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Figure 2: Robustness of the results across game configu-
rations and parameters of punishment and commitment.
Shown are the results of 10000 numerical computations us-
ing T = b, R = b − 1, P = 0, S = −1 (Donor game, with
c = 1) and randomly sampling from uniform distributions
on the intervals: 2 ≤ b ≤ 6; 0 ≤ 1, 2 ≤ 3; 1 ≤ δ1 ≤ 101;
2 ≤ δ2 ≤ 102. Other parameters: N = 100, β = 0.1.
FREE-AP, FAKE-AP to COM, to C, and back to the de-
fective strategies) is broken, when the system reaches CP
state. On the one hand, as long as arranging a prior commit-
ment is costly, the regime of COM is taken down by CP
mutants that can establish cooperation among themselves
without having to pay any cost. Note that when COM inter-
acts with CP, COM pays the cost of arranging commitment
(2). Using the inequality (7), we can easily show that CP is
risk-dominant against COM as long as 2 > 0, confirming
that the transition from COM to CP is not particular to the
game configuration being considered. On the other hand, as
COM requires a prior agreement regarding posterior punish-
ment/compensation, antisocial punishment can be prevented
(see transitions from D, AP, FREE-AP, FAKE-AP to COM).
As such, the level of cooperation is significantly increased
(the total fraction of cooperation is 81%). More interest-
ingly, COM is not the most frequent strategy as in the second
scenario (Figure 1b): instead, it catalyzes the emergence and
dominance of CP, hence cooperation.
Robustness to Parameters Change
These interesting observations and results are not particular
to the parameter setting in Figure 1. We compute stationary
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Figure 3: Stationary distributions for varying intensity of selection; a) Antisocial punishment and defection are dominant
when no commitment is present; b) Although commitment performs best, all strategies are present in population; c) Costly pun-
ishment and cooperation are prevalent for increasing intensity of selection when both strategic options are available. Parameters:
T = 4, R = 3, P = 0, S = 1; 1 = 2 = 1, δ1 = δ2 = 3; N = 100.
distributions for 10000 randomly drawn parameter sets (see
Figure 2). The average result is very similar to what was
observed in Figure 1. When commitment is not an option
(Figure 2a), the cooperation frequency is very low (8% on
average), with no sample having more than 50% of coop-
eration. When punishment is not available (Figure 2b), co-
operation is more frequent (41% on average), but defection
is also prevalent (59% on average). In 45% of the samples
there is more than 50% of cooperation. Finally, when both
options are present (Figure 2c), a significantly higher level
of cooperation is achieved (65% on average), with 75% of
the samples having more than 50% of cooperation.
Varying the Intensity of Selection
In the sampling described above, we fixed the intensity of
selection β since unlike the sampled parameters which char-
acterize the strategic nature of the game, it is an external,
environment-wide parameter. As this parameter is an impor-
tant factor in determining population dynamics and station-
ary distributions (Nowak et al. 2004; Imhof, Fudenberg, and
Nowak 2005), we provide a numerical analysis for varying
β (Figure 3).
First, when commitment is not an option, the antisocial
punishment and pure defector strategies are dominant for
sufficiently large β (Figure 3a). When punishment is not an
option, COM is most frequent most of the time, but the other
defective strategies are still present in the population (Figure
3b). However, when both commitment and punishment are
available, CP is dominant especially for large β (Figure 3c).
Although COM is not significant in this scenario, it has
paved the way for the emergence of social punishment CP.
In short, our results show that, on the one hand, social
punishment cannot survive by itself when antisocial punish-
ment is allowed. On the other hand, the prior commitment
proposing mechanism can prevent antisocial punishing be-
haviors but the unavoidable cost needed to sustain the sys-
tem leads to a notable presence of defectors. Happily, if both
mechanisms are available, in co-presence, social punishment
thrives leading to significantly enhanced levels of coopera-
tion.
Concluding Remarks
This paper presents a novel approach to coping with the an-
tisocial punishment issue, providing an explanation for the
conundrum of the evolution of social punishment and coop-
eration. We showed, in the context of the one-shot PD, that
if in addition to using punishment, agents in a population
can propose cooperation agreements to their co-players prior
to an interaction, social punishment and cooperation can
thrive even in the presence of antisocial punishment. First
of all, antisocial punishers can be significantly restrained
by commitment proposing agents since only those who dis-
honor a commitment deal can be enforced to pay compen-
sation. Moreover, as arranging a commitment deal is costly,
its regime can be replaced by social punishers who do not
have to pay this cost while still can maintain cooperation
among themselves. Indeed, our results showed that when
both strategic options are available, social punishment dom-
inates its population (which contains antisocial punishment
players). As a consequence, a significantly higher level of
cooperation is achieved compared to the case when either
of the strategic options is absent. This is a rather surprising
outcome since arranging prior commitments, by itself, is al-
ready a strong mechanism that can enforce a notable level
of cooperation. But by sacrificing for a strategy that is vul-
nerable to antisocial behaviors and defection, it results in
significant improvements in terms of cooperation. That is,
the commitment mechanism catalyzes for the emergence of
social punishment and cooperation.
These observations and results suggest new insights into
the design of computerized and MAS systems that can pre-
vent antisocial behaviors while at the same time, maximize
the benefit of deploying an appropriate sanctioning system.
References
Airiau, S.; Sen, S.; and Villatoro, D. 2014. Emergence of
conventions through social learning. Autonomous Agents
and Multi-Agent Systems 28(5):779–804.
Boyd, R.; Gintis, H.; Bowles, S.; and Richerson, P. J. 2003.
The evolution of altruistic punishment. Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences 100(6):3531–3535.
Castelfranchi, C., and Falcone, R. 2010. Trust Theory: A
Socio-Cognitive and Computational Model (Wiley Series in
Agent Technology). Wiley.
Chopra, A. K., and Singh, M. P. 2009. Multiagent commit-
ment alignment. In AAMAS’2009, 937–944.
De Quervain, D. J.; Fischbacher, U.; Treyer, V.; Schellham-
mer, M.; et al. 2004. The neural basis of altruistic punish-
ment. Science 305(5688):1254.
Fehr, E., and Gachter, S. 2002. Altruistic punishment in
humans. Nature 415:137–140.
Han, T. A., and Lenaerts, T. 2015. The efficient interaction
of costly punishment and commitment. In AAMAS’2015,
1657–1658.
Han, T. A.; Pereira, L. M.; Santos, F. C.; and Lenaerts, T.
2013. Good agreements make good friends. Scientific re-
ports 3(2695).
Han, T. A.; Santos, F. C.; Lenaerts, T.; and Pereira, L. M.
2015. Synergy between intention recognition and commit-
ments in cooperation dilemmas. Scientific reports 5(9312).
Han, T. A.; Pereira, L. M.; and Lenaerts, T. 2015. Avoiding
or Restricting Defectors in Public Goods Games? Journal
of the Royal Society Interface 12(103):20141203.
Han, T. A.; Pereira, L. M.; and Santos, F. C. 2012. The emer-
gence of commitments and cooperation. In AAMAS’2012,
559–566.
Han, T. A. 2013. Intention Recognition, Commitments and
Their Roles in the Evolution of Cooperation: From Artificial
Intelligence Techniques to Evolutionary Game Theory Mod-
els, volume 9. Springer SAPERE series.
Harrenstein, P.; Brandt, F.; and Fischer, F. 2007. Commit-
ment and extortion. In AAMAS ’07, 1–8.
Hasan, M. R., and Raja, A. 2013. Emergence of cooper-
ation using commitments and complex network dynamics.
In IEEE/WIC/ACM Intl Joint Conf. on Web Intelligence and
Intelligent Agent Technologies, volume 2, 345–352.
Hauert, C.; Traulsen, A.; Brandt, H.; Nowak, M. A.; and Sig-
mund, K. 2007. Via freedom to coercion: The emergence of
costly punishment. Science 316:1905–1907.
Herrmann, B.; Tho¨ni, C.; and Ga¨chter, S. 2008. Antisocial
Punishment Across Societies. Science 319:1362–1367.
Hilbe, C., and Traulsen, A. 2012. Emergence of respon-
sible sanctions without second order free riders, antisocial
punishment or spite. Scientific reports 2(458).
Hofbauer, J., and Sigmund, K. 1998. Evolutionary Games
and Population Dynamics. Cambridge University Press.
Imhof, L. A.; Fudenberg, D.; and Nowak, M. A. 2005. Evo-
lutionary cycles of cooperation and defection. Proceedings
of the National Academy of Sciences 102:10797–10800.
Martinez-Vaquero, L. A.; Han, T. A.; Pereira, L. M.; and
Lenaerts, T. 2015. Apology and forgiveness evolve to re-
solve failures in cooperative agreements. Scientific reports
5(10639).
Michalak, T.; Tyrowicz, J.; McBurney, P.; and Wooldridge,
M. 2009. Exogenous coalition formation in the e-
marketplace based on geographical proximity. Electronic
Commerce Research and Applications 8(4):203–223.
Nesse, R. M. 2001. Evolution and the capacity for commit-
ment. Series on trust. Russell Sage.
Nowak, M. A.; Sasaki, A.; Taylor, C.; and Fudenberg, D.
2004. Emergence of cooperation and evolutionary stability
in finite populations. Nature 428:646–650.
Nowak, M. A. 2006. Five rules for the evolution of cooper-
ation. Science 314(5805):1560.
Powers, S. T.; Taylor, D. J.; and Bryson, J. J. 2012. Pun-
ishment can promote defection in group-structured popula-
tions. Journal of theoretical biology 311:107–116.
Raihani, N. J., and Bshary, R. 2015. The reputation of pun-
ishers. Trends in ecology & evolution 30(2):98–103.
Rand, D. G., and Nowak, M. A. 2011. The evolution of an-
tisocial punishment in optional public goods games. Nature
Communications 2:434.
Rand, D. G.; Armao IV, J. J.; Nakamaru, M.; and Ohtsuki, H.
2010. Anti-social punishment can prevent the co-evolution
of punishment and cooperation. Journal of Theoretical Bi-
ology 265(4):624 – 632.
Sasaki, T.; Okada, I.; Uchida, S.; and Chen, X. 2015. Com-
mitment to cooperation and peer punishment: Its evolution.
Games 6(4):574–587.
Savarimuthu, B. T. R., and Cranefield, S. 2011. Norm
creation, spreading and emergence: A survey of simulation
models of norms in multi-agent systems. Multiagent and
Grid Systems 7(1):21–54.
Savarimuthu, B. T. R.; Purvis, M.; Purvis, M.; and Crane-
field, S. 2009. Social norm emergence in virtual agent soci-
eties. In Declarative Agent Languages and Technologies VI.
Springer. 18–28.
Sigmund, K.; Silva, H. D.; Traulsen, A.; and Hauert, C.
2010. Social learning promotes institutions for governing
the commons. Nature 466:7308.
Sigmund, K.; Hauert, C.; and Nowak, M. 2001. Reward
and punishment. Proceedings of the National Academy of
Sciences 98(19):10757–10762.
Sigmund, K. 2010. The Calculus of Selfishness. Princeton
University Press.
Traulsen, A.; Nowak, M. A.; and Pacheco, J. M. 2006.
Stochastic dynamics of invasion and fixation. Phys. Rev. E
74:11909.
Winikoff, M. 2007. Implementing commitment-based inter-
actions. In AAMAS ’07, 868–875.
Wooldridge, M., and Jennings, N. R. 1999. The cooperative
problem-solving process. In Journal of Logic and Compu-
tation, 403–417.
